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he Swiss parliament last month gave up on attempts to introduce quotas for foreign 
residents when it became obvious that any such move would violate Switzerland's 
obligations on freedom of movement under bilateral agreements with the European 
Union. The parliament's decision is expected to defuse the latest tension in EU-Swiss 
relations, which erupted in February 2014 when Swiss voters narrowly approved a 
constitutional amendment to introduce mandatory quotas for foreign residents, including 
EU citizens. Parliamentarians have now put continued access to the Union’s internal market 
above the political imperative for tighter immigration controls. But their choice does nothing 
to address the dynamic underlying the bilateral relationship, which is unfavourable to 
Switzerland and becoming more so as time passes.  
The new regime 
The lower house of parliament (the National Council) adopted new legislation on September 
21st that purports to implement the constitutional requirement for quotas for foreign 
residents. But the choice before the house was unpalatable: implement the letter and spirit of 
the constitutional amendment by adopting quotas, thereby endangering relations with the 
EU, or defy the expressed will of the people and protect Switzerland's all-important access to 
the EU's internal market. After seven hours of debate, it chose the latter, on a 
recommendation backed by a majority of the parties represented in the governing grand 
coalition. Quotas were tacitly set aside in favour of a regime that is supposed to give 
preference to established residents (irrespective of their citizenship) in recruitment and a 
staged approach to managing immigration, with quotas for EU citizens at the government’s 
disposal as the very last resort.  
Rather than introducing quotas, the new regime gives local residents (including non-citizens) 
a slight edge in recruitment for new vacancies: when immigration exceeds certain, as yet 
undefined, thresholds, companies wishing to fill vacancies are obliged to notify local job 
centres, to which non-residents have, in principle, no access. Quotas for EU citizens would be 
imposed only in cases where immigration reaches levels that are no longer in line with 
Switzerland's overall interests. This would give the government sufficient leeway to avoid 
them altogether. In the government's analysis, this approach should be sufficient to satisfy 
the EU and safeguard the principle of free movement.  
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The Council of States, the upper chamber of parliament in which Switzerland's cantons are 
represented, is now expected to approve the draft legislation by mid-December, very likely 
with some tweaks (for example, the lower house sets a three-month deadline for foreigners 
who lose their jobs to leave Switzerland, which in the government's interpretation would 
violate the freedom of movement agreement with the EU). This would put it on the statute 
books just in time for a February 2017 deadline to implement the constitutional amendment. 
It would also set the stage for a new referendum in which Swiss voters might be asked to 
make an explicit choice between limiting the number of foreigners, on the one hand, and 
continuing the current relationship with the EU, on the other. Opinion polls suggest a solid 
majority in favour of preserving access to the internal market.  
What’s at stake 
The government and most parliamentarians rightly feared that a literal interpretation of the 
constitutional amendment would violate the terms of Switzerland's relationship with the EU, 
its most important export market by far. More than half of the country's trade is with the 
Union, and Switzerland is the EU's third biggest partner for trade in goods, after the US and 
China. The Swiss economy is highly dependent not just on exports, especially to the EU, but 
also on foreign workers. Some 28.3% of Swiss residents were born abroad - the second-
highest rate among the world's leading economies, according to figures from the OECD for 
2013 (first-placed Luxembourg, at 43.7%, is an outlier). It is followed by two classic countries 
of immigration – Australia, at 27.7%, and Israel, at 22.6%. The UK is far behind, with a 
foreign-born population of just 12.3%. Switzerland, a country of 8.1 million, is home to some 
1.36 million EU citizens. The UK (population: 64 million) has 1.5 million residents from other 
EU member states.  
It is quite evident that the legislation is a tacit acknowledgement that the constitutional 
requirement for quotas, at least in a literal reading, is incompatible with Switzerland's 
obligations under the bilateral agreements with the EU. Moreover, its effect on immigration – 
the focus of the 2014 vote – is expected to be negligible. Even its proponents expect an annual 
net reduction in immigration of 11,000 at most, around one-seventh of last year’s net 
immigration. The parliament has chosen a path that protects access to the internal market 
with just the slightest of nods towards migration management.  
The EU side 
Jean-Claude Juncker, President of the European Commission, suggested after talks in Berne 
that the new legislation might satisfy the Commission. Several EU member states (including 
Belgium and Sweden) have similar systems in place, which would suggest that they are 
compatible with the rules on free movement.  
But Juncker's amenability is superficial. The Commission has grown hostile to special deals, 
and particularly those to do with migration and freedom of movement. Post-Brexit 
referendum, it is hunkering down in a bid to arrest any restrictive tendencies among member 
states. The member states in the Council of the EU are also quite hostile to special demands, 
a hostility that has deepened in the aftermath of the Brexit vote. The UK, which in principle 
might be an ally, is not going to use what little influence it has in the EU to lobby for a 
country without much strategic importance. Switzerland's neighbours are focused on the 
hundreds of thousands of jobs that Switzerland provides to their citizens. And the member 
states that joined in 2004 and after are exercised about anything that smacks of 
discrimination against their nationals.  
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The broader picture 
The decision of the Swiss parliament is probably sufficient to defuse the immediate crisis 
created by the 2014 vote; but it does nothing to help with the broader question of Swiss-EU 
relations. In a traumatic vote in 1992 that poisoned the debate on Europe for many years, 
Swiss voters went against the government and all major political parties and rejected 
accession to the European Economic Area, which had been set up to give EFTA members 
such as Switzerland and Norway access to the Union's internal market.  
In the wake of the vote, which split the country and propelled the anti-EU and anti-
immigration Swiss People's Party to become the leading force in national politics, Swiss 
diplomats pulled off a major feat by negotiating favourable terms for Switzerland's access to 
the internal market. But in recent years, the EU has become increasingly frustrated with the 
tangle of sector-specific, static agreements that formalised the post-1992 relationship. These 
deals (some 120 in all) were grouped in two main packages. The first, adopted in 1999, 
concerns, among other things, freedom of movement between the two sides and includes a 
‘guillotine clause’: failure to implement a single agreement would lead to the automatic 
suspension of the other agreements in the package. 
The EU is now demanding a comprehensive framework agreement that would set the terms 
for sectoral deals, including mechanisms to ensure compliance by the Swiss side and the 
automatic application of new EU law in a given field – a "common institutional framework 
for existing and future agreements through which Switzerland participates in the EU's 
internal market, in order to ensure homogeneity and legal certainty in the internal market," 
according to the Council of the EU).1 The Council approved a negotiating mandate for a 
framework agreement with Switzerland in May 2014; a senior official involved in the talks 
estimated that they would take anything from a few months to a year. Two and a half years 
later, they remain in deadlock.  
On the Swiss side, a framework agreement that is so evidently modelled on the EEA might 
not easily meet with the approval of the national parliament or the electorate. On the EU 
side, the Brexit vote appears to have turned the mood against special regimes to appease 
national sensitivities – be they of members or non-members. Swiss diplomats may yet find 
that the post-Brexit EU that is gradually taking shape is far less accommodating towards 
Swiss demands than it was after 1992.  
                                                     
1 Council Conclusions of 16 December 2014. 
